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Abstract 
In 2002, the German government tried to increase private old-age provisions by introducing 
incentives such as supplementary subsidies and tax credits. Since then, the so-called “Riester 
pension” has grown in popularity. Apart from subsidized pension plans, unsubsidized private pension 
insurances as an instrument for old-age have been enormously important for a long time. With data 
for the years 2005 to 2009 from the German SAVE study, we analyze whether the decision for a 
“Riester pension” is independent of the decision for unsubsidized private pension insurance using 
methods for simultaneous equations. Our estimation results indicate that decisions on “Riester” and 
private pensions are not independent and the proposed random-parameters bivariate probit model 
results in efficiency gains compared to single probit estimations. Regarding governmental subsidies, 
we find positive incentive effects of child subsidies whereas low income earners are not induced to 
increase their old-age provisions. Further, there is strong evidence for a “crowding-in” among 
alternative assets as well as a significant effect of demand inducement. Finally, considering the saving 
motives, individuals do not take a “Riester pension” because of securing pension payments only but 
to pick up granted subsidies. 
 
Keywords: subsidized pension, saving incentives, bivariate probit panel 
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1 Introduction 
Major financing problems of the public pay-as-you-go pension system are caused by the 
demographic change. Therefore, keeping up a pay-as-you-go system is contingent upon the 
development of the working to non-working or old-age dependency ratio. These proportions are 
influenced by the birth rate, life-expectancy as well as the level of migration. Decreasing birth-rates 
and an increasing life-span result in a larger proportion of elderly people in the population which has 
to be financed by a decreasing number of younger people. Hence, Germany among many other 
countries has implemented pension reforms reducing the overall pension level (reform in 2001) and 
raising the statutory retirement age (reform in 2005). Especially the first change will lead to 
significant lower old-age income which may not ensure the current standard of living. By introducing 
incentives the German government tried to increase private old-age provisions. In 2002, the so-called 
“Riester pension” 1  was introduced to foster the voluntary retirement arrangements by 
supplementary allowances and tax credits by the state. Since then the “Riester pension” has grown in 
popularity. Today, about 13 million contracts are registered. Many studies (e.g. Corneo et al. 2009 
and 2010; Börsch-Supan et al. 2008b; Coppola and Reil-Held 2009) analyze how these subsidies work. 
They focus on the determinants influencing the uptake of a “Riester pension”. For example, do 
younger individuals join the subsidized new pension scheme more frequently than the elderly, or 
whether private savings are crowded out through the heavily subsidized “Riester pension”. In 
contrast to this, traditional private pension insurance is less regulated by the government and hence 
offers higher flexibility concerning the payment of the insurance benefit. Moreover, only 50 % of the 
revenues are taxed. 
The aim of this paper is to assess possible determinants of the uptake of private pensions. Therefore, 
we study the relation between subsidized “Riester pensions” and unsubsidized private pension 
schemes. The main research question addressed by this paper focuses on the governmental subsidies 
and whether these subsidies incentivize special forms of private pension schemes. More specifically, 
we consider if the determinants of the uptake of both forms of private pensions - e.g. socioeconomic 
and financial factors - point into the same direction. Moreover, we investigate whether the uptake of 
a private pension scheme is influenced by insurance agents, i.e. are there any demand inducement 
effects fostering the signing of a special group of contracts. Finally, we analyze whether public 
allowance accelerates the signing of subsidized pension schemes and the effects on unsubsidized 
contracts. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature by revisiting the relationship between subsidized and 
unsubsidized pension schemes using German panel data (SAVE study). Thereby, we fill the gap of 
                                                          
1
 The “Riester-pension” was named after Walter Riester, the former federal minister of labor and social affairs. 
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former studies that rely on cross-section data and thus neglect any time effects as well as the 
influence of unobserved heterogeneity. Using methods for simultaneous equations, we analyze 
whether the decision for a “Riester pension” is independent of the decision for unsubsidized private 
pension insurance. In addition to former studies also using the SAVE survey, we take advantage of a 
broader set of explanatory factors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two describes the German old-age 
pension scheme and gives a brief introduction into the subsidized private “Riester-pension”. The next 
section gives an overview of the related empirical literature dealing with the incentive effects of 
subsidized private pension schemes. In the following chapter, we describe the dataset and discuss 
the empirical methodology followed by the presentation of the results in chapter five. Section six 
finally concludes the findings. 
2 The German pension scheme 
For the following analysis it is crucial to give a brief description of the German old-age pension 
scheme. Today, the old-age provision consists of three independent pillars differing in financing and 
organization from each other. Generally the three pillars are: the public pay-as-you-go system, 
occupational pension schemes and private old-age provision.2 The public first pillar is still the most 
important institution to prevent poverty and ensure the standard of living after retiring. 80 percent 
of the working population today is covered by the statutory pension insurance at the same time over 
89 percent of the retirees receive a pension (BMAS 2008, p. 12). However, the pay-as-you-go system 
is exposed to major financing problems caused by the demographic change. Two trends are the 
major causes of population ageing: first, increasing life expectancy and second, a decreasing fertility. 
Therefore, the German government began to reform the public system to the end that the system 
will be stabilized and financeable for future generations. As a result the overall pension level (reform 
in 2001) will be reduced and the statutory retirement age (reform in 2005) will increase from 65 up 
to 67 years. The 2001 reform will lead to a significant lower old-age income in future which may not 
ensure the current standard of living. By introducing incentives the German government tried to 
increase old-age provisions to compensate for these future cuts in public pensions (Börsch-Supan 
and Wilke 2004). First, individuals may convert part of their salary into contributions to pension plans 
(second pillar). This is promoted by the government through tax deferrals and exemption from social 
security contributions. Second, individuals may choose to invest in private old-age provision to close 
the pension gap. 
                                                          
2
 While the first pillar is a pay-as-you-go system, the second and third pillar is capital funded. 
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2.1 Private old-age provision: subsidized and unsubsidized pension schemes 
One of the major goals of the 2001 pension reform in Germany was to prompt especially low-income 
earners to make provision for old-age as they are extremely affected by the reduction of the overall 
pension level. “Riester pension” products are promoted through fixed supplements and tax 
advantages by the State (see BMAS 2009 and Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2004).3 People are entitled to 
“Riester pension plans” if they are directly affected by the 2001 pension reform and are still actively 
insured in the respective pension schemes. Moreover, spouses without direct entitlement are 
indirectly entitled if their partner is direct eligibile. Not eligible are self-employed people not 
mandatorily insured in the public system, students as well as low-income earners (up to 400 € per 
month). To qualify for subsidies, the personal contribution including the governmental subsides must 
account for at least 4% of the individual’s yearly gross income. If the contributions to a “Riester” 
contract are lower, the subsidies are reduced proportionally. Moreover, higher subsidies directly 
lower the personal net-contribution.4 Since the introduction, financial support has been increased in 
four steps. From 2008 on, the “Riester pension” has reached its highest level of public assistance. The 
basic benefit is now € 154 and the child subsidy is € 185 per year for each child for whom the 
beneficiary receives child benefit. For children born from 2008 onwards, the child supplement is € 
300. In addition, the retirement pension contributions (taking into account the supplement) up to € 
2,100 can be offset as additional special expenditure against tax. By construction of the German 
income tax system, tax expenditures are favorable for higher incomes. Overall, the official statistic of 
the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2010) suggest a strongly increasing uptake of 
subsidized “Riester-pensions”. Until the end of 2009 more than 13 million “Riester” contracts were 
signed. Since a modification of the “Riester-pension” in the year 2005 simplified the application 
procedure and reduced the complexity, demand for a subsidized old-age provision has increased. 
Apart from subsidized pension plans, private pension insurances are popular instruments for old-age 
provision. In addition, cash-value life insurance as an instrument for old-age and survivor provision 
has been tremendously important for a long time. Both forms differ with respect to taxation of 
revenues and the inclusion of the event of death. For cash-value life insurance this means that the 
inclusion of the risk of death lead to a higher risk component in relation to the savings component. 
Thus, individuals have to fill out a health questionnaire prior to the signing to determine their relative 
risk. Regarding the taxation of private old-age provision, revenues from a “Riester” contract are fully 
taxed whereas revenue from a private pension insurance are only taxed up to 18 %. To sum up, 
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 As from 2005, supplementary pension contributions have also received special tax concessions in the form of 
‘Basis’ pension plans, also called ‘Rürup’ plans. This form of private pension provision is especially attractive for 
self-employed people, freelancers and business people who are not eligible for “Riester” support or 
occupational pension plans and must therefore make their own provision for retirement. 
4
 If subsidies are equal to or higher than 4 % of yearly gross income, the minimum personal contribution is set 
to 60 € per year. 
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“Riester” pensions and traditional private pension schemes are comparable investments but differ 
with respect to subsidization, flexibility and taxation. Hence, it is interesting to analyze whether the 
demand for these two forms of old-age provisions is due to differences in the regulatory framework. 
3 Literature Review 
For the purpose of this analysis the literature on the determinants of private old-age provision can be 
classified into two strands. One strand emphasizes the uptake of a subsidized (“Riester-pension”). 
The focus of another strand is on signing alternative unsubsidized private pension insurance.  
The “Riester-pension” is considered as publicly subsidized private old-age provision in the related 
literature. These subsidies trigger a substitution effect as well as an income effect in the way that the 
substitution effect deflects unsubsidized savings in subsidized ones.5 By contrast the income effect 
displaces private savings in the amount of the public allowances (cf. Blankart 2008). Thus, Prinz et al. 
(2003) focus on the effects induced by the public allowances on the choice behavior of private 
households using a microeconomic analysis. They show that public subsidies – in a two period 
framework - increase the current consumption and therefore displace private savings.  
Major research concentrates on the substitution effect based on the “Riester-pension”. Corneo et al. 
(2009; 2010) analyze the propensity to save of low-income private households in Germany. The data 
used in their analysis are the German Socioeconomic Panel6 as well as the German SAVE study.7 The 
results of the first study indicate that governmental subsidies neither have a significant effect on the 
propensity to save of private households nor increase the proportion of saving households within 
low-income groups. Continuing research in their 2010 study focuses on a broader definition of the 
sample confirming their first findings. According to this, private households marginally react to the 
subsidy incentives of the “Riester-pension” by increasing their private old-age provision. The authors 
conclude that taking up “Riester-pension” substitutes other forms of savings.  
Furthermore, Börsch-Supan et al. (2007) give additional evidence for the existence of a substitution 
effect. Using cross-section data from the German SAVE study for 2005 the authors investigate the 
determinants fostering the uptake of a subsidized “Riester-pension”. They find that public subsidies 
are a main reason for saving and therefore affect the uptake of a “Riester-pension” significantly 
positive. Another result is rested on socioeconomic factors. Younger individuals and those with 
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 This substitution effect is commonly referred to as “crowding in” (cf. Börsch-Supan et al. 2008b; Corneo et al. 
2010).  
6
 The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual representative panel survey starting in 1984. 
7
 The SAVE study started in 2001 and is a representative longitudinal household survey on households’ financial 
behavior focusing on the saving decisions and old-age provisions. The survey is conducted by the Mannheim 
Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA). For further information see Börsch-Supan et al. (2007; 
2008a). 
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children sign a “Riester-pension” more likely. In addition, the lowest income quintile has a significant 
negative effect on the probability to own a “Riester-pension”. The analysis of Coppola and Reil-Held 
(2009) provides related results using more recent data. The findings also substantiate the negative 
income effect. Thus, households of the lowest income quintile sign significantly less often a “Riester” 
contract than those of the middle income quintile. 
Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the year 2007, Geyer and Steiner (2009) 
analyze whether low-income households are more likely to sign a “Riester-pension” than higher 
incomes. The results are in line with Börsch-Supan et al. (2007) and Coppola and Reil-Held (2009) 
suggesting that the political goal has not been achieved up to now. According to this, individuals with 
a yearly gross income less than 10,000 euro infrequently have a “Riester-pension” available than 
higher incomes. Also using cross-section data from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the year 
2007, Lampig and Tepe (2009) study the determinants of old-age provision taking alternative savings 
as explanatory factors into account. A first result is that individuals holding more than one 
investment have a significant higher probability to own a “Riester” contract. In contrast to other 
studies, the authors provide evidence that woman are likelier to take up a “Riester-pension” than 
men.  
In contrast to previous studies Pfarr and Schneider (2011) use panel data for the years 2004, 2006 
and 2007 from the German Socioeconomic Panel to explore whether publicly subsidized savings are 
driven by the incentives of child benefits and if supplier induced demand is an important factor. The 
authors find evidence that individuals have a higher probability to sign a “Riester” contract if they are 
in a higher income quintile; do have higher education and more children. They show that a contact 
with an insurance agent in the previous year is one major factor for the uptake of a “Riester-
pension”. Moreover, their results indicate differences regarding gender and socialization. 
To sum up the findings of the first strand of literature concerning the uptake of a “Riester-pension”, 
there exists evidence that subsidizing private old-age provision has lead low-income earner neither 
to prevent more for old-age nor to increase the propensity to save of private households. Moreover, 
individuals indicating public subsidies as a main reason for savings more often join a “Riester-
contract”. These results suggest, that private households substitute unsubsidized savings through 
subsidized ones. In addition, the studies suggest that the incentives of child-related benefits are an 
important factor.  
The second strand of the literature intent to highlight determinants fostering the uptake of 
unsubsidized private pension insurance. Schulte and Zirpel (2010) concentrate on adverse selection 
in the determinants of private pension insurance uptake in Germany using data from the German 
SAVE study for the year 2005. The results show, that subjective life-expectancy is positively related 
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with the probability of signing private pension insurance. Thus, individuals have rational expectations 
of their life-expectancy when deciding to make provisions for old-age in form of private pension 
insurance. In addition, the findings show a significant negative effect of the number of children which 
can be interpreted as a form of altruism. In the second part of their study Börsch-Supan et al. (2007) 
investigate the factors of signing private pension insurance contracts. Also with data from the 
German SAVE study for the year 2005 they show that the number of children as well as to be in the 
two lowest income quintiles is negatively related with the probability of having a private pension 
insurance. Furthermore, a variable regarding old-age as saving motive shows a significant positive 
coefficient. The authors summarize that the expressed attitudes correspond with current behavior.  
Finally, there is one study similar to our approach. Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b) focus on the impact of 
household characteristics on the uptake of either subsidized “Riester-pension” or unsubsidized 
private pension insurance.8 The decision to enroll in one of the both forms of old-age provision is 
modeled simultaneously. Using data for 2005 from the German SAVE study the results suggest that 
the most important factor determining the uptake of a “Riester-pension” is the categorical variable 
number of children. However, this effect does not exist for taking up unsubsidized pension 
insurances. Furthermore, income is only relevant for the decision on private pension insurance. The 
authors also control for different saving motives. They find a significant positive coefficient for public 
subsidies as reason for saving. This effect cannot be found in the decision making process for an 
unsubsidized private pension insurance. Alternative forms of savings are captured in one variable 
containing for instance occupational pension schemes or life-insurance contracts. This variable has a 
highly significant positive effect on the probability of signing a “Riester” contract as well as private 
pension insurance. In both cases the magnitude of the effect is similar. The authors conclude that 
households use different approaches to make provisions for old-age resulting in a “crowding-in” 
among private pension products.  
As a shortcoming, all the presented studies except of Pfarr and Schneider (2011) rely on cross-section 
data and therefore omit the possibility to control for time effects and unobserved heterogeneity 
through the application of panel data models. In addition, there is no study combining 
socioeconomic factors with saving motives, alternative investments, and the effect of demand 
inducement as well as adverse selection all together in one approach.  
We aim at filling this gap by revisiting the relationship between subsidized and unsubsidized pension 
schemes using German panel data (SAVE study). Using a simultaneous equations approach, we 
analyze the dependence of the decisions for a “Riester pension” and for unsubsidized private pension 
                                                          
8
Börsch-Supan et al. use a bivariate probit model for analyzing the dependency between the uptake of “Riester 
pensions” and private pension insurance. Nevertheless, the correlation between the simultaneously modeled 
probit regressions is not statistically significant. 
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insurance. Our main advantage to former studies also using the SAVE survey is that we take 
advantage of a broader set of explanatory factors and use data for several years to capture effects 
over time.   
4 Data and Methods 
For the following analysis, we use data from the representative German SAVE study, which is 
conducted by the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA) and started in 
2001 (Börsch-Supan et al. 2008a). The longitudinal study on households’ financial behavior focuses 
on savings and old-age provisions. As is observable in other survey studies, item non-response can 
lead to problems for the analysis of those variables with non-responses as well as for the estimation 
results and covariance structures. This is frequently for variables covering income, assets or old-age 
provisions. One possibility to deal with this problem is to delete all observations with non-responses 
which reduces sample size and goes along with a loss of statistical efficiency. In the SAVE data, 
missing values are estimated using a variant of the iterative multiple imputation procedure (cf. Little 
and Rubin 2002). Hence, instead of one original data set containing the missing values, we work with 
five completely imputed datasets for each observation year (2005-2009), where all missings are 
replaced by imputed values.9 These datasets differ slightly with respect to the imputed variables and 
reflect the uncertainty about the true values of the missing attributes. For all datasets, five 
repetitions are used to generate each imputed dataset.  
For the study at hand, we restrict our dataset to those individuals eligible for a “Riester pension”. We 
run a regression for two binary dependent variables Riester and private pension on socioeconomic, 
financial and saving motives variables using an unbalanced panel structure. A full description of the 
variables is presented in Table 1.  
To cover nonlinear age effects and to avoid an arbitrary definition of age categories, we apply age 
quintiles for our analysis. The reference is age quintile one consisting of those individuals aged 31 or 
younger. To control for adverse selection in the private pension market we additional take the 
subjective life-expectancy into account. The variable Rest life reflects the years between the stated 
life-expectancy in the survey and the current age. The interpretation is as follows: a higher value of 
Rest life indicates a considerable time to life. Thus, if individuals take their life-expectancy into 
account in the decision making process, the variable Rest life should have a positive coefficient. The 
group of socioeconomic factors further covers gender effects, the influence of education, whether 
the respondent lives in East or West Germany as well as family and labor force status. 
  
                                                          
9
 Only variables on age and gender contain no missing values. 
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Table 1: Variable description 
variable name label 
Time fixed effects  
D2006 dummy year = 2006 
D2007 dummy year = 2007 
D2008 dummy year = 2008 
D2009 dummy year = 2009 
Socioeconomic variables  
East German Living in East Germany 
Female 1=female, 0=male 
Age quintile 2 age >31 and <=41 
Age quintile 3 age >41 and <=47 
Age quintile 4 age >47 and <=53 
Age quintile 5 age >53 
Rest life subjective expected years to life 
Number children 1 1 or 2 children 
Number children 2 3 or 4 children 
Number children 3 at least 5 children 
Married 1, if married 
Widowed 1, if widowed 
Divorced 1, if divorced 
O-Level first public examination in secondary school yes/no 
High school general qualification for university entrance yes/no 
University university degree yes/no 
relative poor less than 50 % of the median of equivalent household net income 
precarious wealth 50-100 % of the median of equivalent household net income 
higher income 150-200 % of the median of equivalent household net income 
relative wealth  more than 200 % of the median of equivalent household net income 
Full time full time employed (at least 35 h) yes /no 
Part time part time employed (15 to 34 h) yes/no 
Financial variables  
building loan contract 1= holding a building loan contract, 0=not 
Cash-value life insurance 1= holding a cash-value life insurance, 0=not 
Accumulation plan 1= holding an accumulation plan, 0=not 
Stocks 1= stock holding, 0=not 
Investment bonds 1= holding investment bonds, 0=not 
Home owner 1= real estate property, 0=not 
Financial advice 1 1 counseling interview per year 
Financial advice 2 more than 4 counseling interviews per year 
Financial advice 1 * 
strong compliance 
Interaction Financial advice 1 and strong compliance to the advice 
Financial advice 2 * 
strong compliance 
Interaction Financial advice 2 and strong compliance to the advice 
Tax advisor contact with a tax advisor 
Risk aversion 1, if not willing to take financial risks 
Saving motive: old age 1, if saving motive is old age provision 
Saving motive: subsidies 1, if saving motive are state subsidies 
10 
 
Especially in terms of the subsidized “Riester-pension” the child-related subsidies should positively 
affect the probability to sign a “Riester” contract. In contrast, the literature indicates that the 
number of children has a negative impact on owning private pension insurance. Income is included 
as five income categories using the equivalent monthly net household income. The reference 
category is the 100 to 150 % interval of median income. With respect to the literature, we predict a 
negative impact of the lowest income category on the uptake of a “Riester-pension”. The same is 
true for private pension insurance. Moreover, the effects of income on taking up a subsidized or 
unsubsidized old-age provision are highly relevant. 
Figure 1 reflects the development of the uptake of “Riester” contracts and private pension insurance 
in the German population separated by the five income categories. There exist wide differences in 
the level and development over the categories. In 2009, merely 25 percent of the relative poor 
households hold a “Riester-pension” but only a small fraction of this group owns private pension 
insurance. Whereas almost 50 percent of the higher incomes have taken up a “Riester”-contract. The 
highest proportion of pension insurance occurs as expected in the highest income category. It should 
be noted, that the presented development of holding private pension insurance may underestimate 
the true value since we constrain our dataset to those, eligible for a subsidized “Riester-pension” and 
therefore exclude self-employed.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of „Riester-pension“ and private pension insurance in the population by income 
categories 
 
Notice: The solid line indicates the mean of “Riester-pension” in the respective year whereas the dashed line   
resembles the mean of private pension insurance. 
Source: SAVE (2010). 
To assess the impact of alternative savings, in a second specification, additional information on 
building loan contracts, cash-value life insurances, accumulation plans, real estate ownership and 
stock ownership are included. We assume that individuals or households use several instruments to 
provide for old-age. Therefore, the coefficient of these alternative savings should have a positive 
sign. 
Moreover, demand for financial advice and strength of financial compliance are considered as 
explanatory factors. We hypothesize that individuals visiting an advisor are more likely to sign a 
“Riester” contract or private pension insurance than others. In addition, we also take into account an 
interaction between financial advice and the strength of financial compliance to control for a 
possible demand inducement. The appeal of “Riester” products for the financial industry in Germany 
is obvious. Through the complexity of “Riester-pension” products competition between various 
providers is minimized. Thus, the insurance commissions as well as the marketing costs for “Riester” 
products are relatively high. As a result, the active marketing of “Riester-pensions” may result in 
demand inducement.  
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Finally, saving motives are covered through two binary variables. The first, Saving motive: old age is 
assumed to positively influence the probability of both, “Riester-pension” and private pension 
insurance. The second, Saving motive: subsidies is included to check whether respondents confirm 
with their behavior. 
The summary statistics are presented in Table 210. Overall, the unbalanced panel dataset consists of 
6,824 individuals. Besides the variable rest life, all other explanatory variables are binary. Averaged 
over the five observation years 26.5 % of the respondents own a “Riester-pension” and 19.2 % 
private pension insurance. For the age quintiles, the panel summary statistics shows a deviation of 
20 %. This is because we use an unbalanced panel and average thresholds vary between observation 
years. The mean of expected years to live is approximately 35. About 53 % of the respondents state 
to have one or two children, circa 60 % to be married. The most common income category is 
precarious wealth covering about 38 % of the respondents. In addition, one can gather the typical 
right- skewed income distribution from the mean of income variables. With a look at financial assets, 
the percentage of individuals holding alternative investments such as building loan contracts, cash-
value life insurances or accumulation plans is relative high. While a large proportion in our dataset 
holds diverse assets, it is interesting that only 16.6 % of the respondents state to visit an advisor once 
per year, more less more than four times a year. Moreover, the compliance is relatively low. Only up 
to 4 % of those with one visit claim to be compliance with the advice. The demand for insurance may 
also depend on the risk aversion of the respondent. In our data, more than 78 % are not willing to 
take financial risks. The major reason for saving is to provide for old-age, whereas state subsidies are 
only relevant for about 26 % of the respondents.  
                                                          
10
 The table contains information on the first imputation. The four other imputed data sets differ only slightly 
and are available upon request. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
  N = 6,824 
 Mean SD 
Dependent variables   
Riester 0.265 0.441 
Private Pension 0.192 0.394 
Time fixed effects   
D2006 0.268 0.443 
D2007 0.217 0.412 
D2008 0.188 0.391 
D2009 0.154 0.361 
Socioeconomic variables   
East German 0.273 0.446 
Female 0.532 0.499 
Age quintile 2 0.213 0.410 
Age quintile 3 0.226 0.418 
Age quintile 4 0.200 0.400 
Age quintile 5 0.190 0.392 
Rest life 35.761 13.515 
Number children 1 0.538 0.499 
Number children 2 0.176 0.381 
Number children 3 0.025 0.157 
Married 0.596 0.491 
Widowed 0.158 0.365 
Divorced 0.014 0.119 
O-Level 0.429 0.495 
High school 0.313 0.464 
University 0.165 0.371 
relative poor 0.120 0.325 
precarious wealth 0.382 0.486 
higher income 0.115 0.320 
relative wealth  0.076 0.266 
Full time 0.573 0.495 
Part time 0.161 0.368 
Financial variables   
building loan contract 0.407 0.491 
Cash-value life insurance 0.409 0.492 
Accumulation plan 0.566 0.496 
Stocks 0.268 0.443 
Investment bonds 0.081 0.272 
Home owner 0.492 0.500 
Financial advice 1 0.166 0.372 
Financial advice 2 0.071 0.257 
Financial advice 1 * strong compliance 0.039 0.194 
Financial advice 2 * strong compliance 0.022 0.148 
Tax advisor 0.315 0.465 
Risk aversion 0.784 0.411 
Saving motive: old age 0.646 0.478 
Saving motive: subsidies 0.265 0.441 
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4.1 Estimation approach 
To analyze the decision about subsidized and unsubsidized private pensions, we use an empirical 
model for simultaneous equations. The advantage of this procedure is that we are able to estimate 
two equations that seem to be independent at first view. Moreover, there might be a correlation 
between them due to the structure of the errors. Firstly, to examine the relationship between the 
two binary variables Riester and private pension, Table 3 present the cross tabulation as well as the 
tetrachoric correlation. Thus, 446 people owning a “Riester-pension” already are holding private 
pension insurance whereas 4,150 people have neither.  
Table 3: Cross-tabulation and tetrachoric correlation 
 Riester-Pension  
Private pension insurance No Yes Total 
No 4,150 1,364 5,514 
Yes 864 446 1,310 
Total 5,014 1,810 6,824 
Tetrachoric  0.155 
Wald test ρ=0 ( 2 ) 0.000 
The tetrachoric correlation measures the correlation between two binary variables since the 
common Pearson Product Moment correlation is inapplicable and rather been used for continuous 
variables (Greene and Hensher 2010). In other words, the tetrachoric correlation corresponds to the 
bivariate probit model without explanatory variables (constant only model). In our case, the 
correlation is 0.155 which is relatively small but highly significant differing from zero. According to 
this, the proposed bivariate model for simultaneous equation seems adequate to analyze the 
decisions on “Riester” and private pension insurance.  
First of all, because we use binary dependent variables as proxy for owning a „Riester-pension“ and 
private pension insurance we need an estimation technique for qualitative dependent variables. For 
cross-section data, the general specification for a two-equation model would be (cf. Maddala 1983 or 
Greene 2008)  
 
* *
1 1 1 1 1 1
* *
2 2 2 2 2 2
, 1 ( 0),
, 1 ( 0),
y x y y
y x y y
 
 
   
   
 (4.1) 
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Here y1 and y2 are binary dependent variables and y* their latent counterpart. The parameter ρ 
reflects the covariance between the two error terms. In other words, ρ measures the impact of 
unobserved factors on the probability to own a “Riester-pension” or private pension insurance. Both 
equations (4.1) can be estimated consistently as single equation probit models. However, this might 
be inefficient as it ignores the correlation between the disturbances (cf. Greene and Hensher 2010). 
Therefore, the correlation coefficient might be of interest. If ρ is statistically different from zero - that 
means that the error terms ε1 and ε2 are not independent – then the above model should not be 
estimated as two independent equations (cf. Maddala 1983, p. 123). Thus, equation (4.1) forms a 
simultaneous equation system.11 We apply a bivariate probit model to estimate the equations above. 
To start with, the joint probability of an outcome 1 2 1y y   can be written in terms of the 
conditional and marginal probabilities as:  
 
     
     
1 2 2 1 1
2 1 2 1 1
Prob 1, 1 Prob 1| 1 Prob 1
1, 1 /Prob 1 Prob 1 .
y y y y y
y y y y
      
     
 (4.2) 
Here, 2  is the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate normal distribution. Together with 
the variables and parameters of the model in (4.1) on gets:  
        1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1Prob 1, 1 , , /y y x x x x             (4.3) 
This results in the following bivariate probability:  
    1 2 2 1 1 2 2Prob 1, 1 , ,y y x x       (4.4) 
The remaining probabilities are then: 
 
   
   
   
1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1 1 2 2
Prob 1, 0 , ,
Prob 0, 1 , ,
Prob 0, 0 , ,
y y x x
y y x x
y y x x
  
  
  
    
    
     
 (4.5) 
                                                          
11
 It is also possible to consider a potential endogeneity of the dependent variables. If we specify the model 
with a mutual influence of both dependent variables, Maddala (1983, p. 117 f.) shows that this model would 
not be consistent or estimable. One solution would be to calculate the probabilities for two binary dependent 
variables where only one dependent variable enters the second equation as explanatory factor resulting in a 
recursive bivariate probit model (cf. Maddala 1983). Nevertheless, this would require some theoretical advice 
on the dependency of each decision to take up a “Riester-pension” or a private pension insurance. 
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These are the probabilities that enter the likelihood function for the bivariate probit model (cf. 
Greene 1998, p. 295).  
With respect to the panel structure, it is important how to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. For 
the bivariate probit model for panel data, we use a generalization of a random effects model 
proposed by Greene. Since the implementation of random effects for a bivariate probit model is 
nontrivial, our approach applies to a random parameters method (Greene 2001). According to this 
approach, the advantage is that all variables – including the constant term – can be treated as 
random. In our specific case, we use a specification where only the constant terms of the two 
equations are assumed to be randomly distributed. In effect, this implementation of a random 
parameters model is equivalent to a random effects bivariate probit model for panel data.  
The general specification of a random parameters model for binary choice rests upon the following 
conditional probability:  
    Prob 1| , ,    1, , , 1, , ,it it i i ity x F x i N t T       (4.6) 
with  F   as the normal distribution. The underlying specification of the vector of coefficients is:  
 ,i i iz v     (4.7) 
where β is the vector of unconditional means. Furthermore, ∆ is a matrix of unknown location 
parameters, iz  is a vector of individual characteristics (heterogeneity term),   a matrix of unknown 
variance parameters and iv  the vector of random latent individual effects, with zero mean. In the 
general random parameters model, it is assumed parameters are randomly distributed across 
individuals with possibly heterogeneous mean and variance: 
 
 
 
E |
Var | .
i i i
i i
z z
z
 

  
 
 (4.8) 
The second term is optional meaning that the parameter matrix 0  . In this case and conditional 
that the coefficient i  is constant, the parameter in view is non-random. In our application of a 
bivariate probit model, we assume that all parameters other than the constant terms in both 
equations are non-random. According to this, the random parameters model is equivalent to the 
following random effects specification: 
17 
 
 
   
   
1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2
1 2 2
   , ,
   ,
, ~  0,0,1,1, , 1 1
, ~  0,0,1,1, , 1 1
it it i it
it it i it
it it
i i
y x i t
y x i t
  
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (4.9) 
1ity  is the binary dependent variable of equation j. The vector j  is the coefficient vector that is 
constant over individuals and time. The heterogeneity has two components: first, heterogeneity 
between individuals represented by the time invariant parameter ij  that is random over individuals. 
Second, heterogeneity between the true disturbances itj . In our case, a random effects model is 
applied using Limdep. Instead of random draws we use the Halton sequence for the simulated 
maximum likelihood to reduce the number of draws and computation time. 
4.2 Obtaining results from multiple imputed datasets 
The estimation with different imputations requires some caution with respect to the ‘averaging’ of 
the results (see Little and Rubin 2002, p. 86). Let ˆkb  be the estimated regression coefficient in 
sample k of the M samples from the random parameters bivariate probit regressions. Then it follows 
that the coefficient vector of the multiple imputation analysis is given by the mean of the single 
estimations 
 
1
1 ˆ ;    1,2, ,
M
M k
k
b b k M
M 
   (4.10) 
The five imputation datasets are conditional draws rather than conditional means. Thus, under a 
good imputation model they provide valid estimates. The standard error Ms  has two components: 
the average within- and the between imputation variance. The within-imputation variance 2ˆks is the 
mean of the estimated standard errors of the responding imputation M ( ˆks ) whereas the between-
imputation variance depends on the difference between the estimated coefficients and the 
corresponding estimate for all imputed datasets  k Mb b . Hence, the standard error is calculated by 
taking  the square root of the sum of the average of the sampling variance and the variance of the 
estimated coefficients that is multiplied by a correction factor 1+1/M. 
  
22
1
1 1 1
ˆ 1
1
M
M k k M
k k
s s b b
M M M
  
     
  
   (4.11) 
One shortcoming of the estimation of multiple imputed datasets is the specification test like a 
likelihood ratio test are not obtainable because it is not possible to average the likelihood values 
across the different imputations. 
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5 Results 
Our estimation results for both restricted and full specification indicate that decisions on “Riester” 
and private pensions are not independent and the proposed random-parameters bivariate probit 
model results in efficiency gains compared to single probit estimations. The correlation of the 
residuals ρ is significantly positive meaning that unobservable factors have a positive influence on 
the likelihood to sign subsidized and unsubsidized private pensions. 
In detail, we observe differences in the magnitude of the coefficient and the corresponding level of 
significance between both equations. For the restricted model (see Table 4) - which does not 
incorporate financial variables - we find a highly significant and positive time gradient for Riester 
whereas only one year is relevant for private pension insurance. Further differences occur regarding 
age quintiles and the number of children. The probability for a “Riester contract” increases for the 
second and third age quintile but decreases for the highest quintile. For private pensions, only the 
second quintile shows a significantly positive effect. According to this, younger individuals have 
recognized future cuts of public pensions and have begun to make private provisions for old-age. 
Subjective years to life (Rest life) show a significant and positive effect only for “Riester pensions”. 
The interpretation is as follows: individual reporting a higher rest life span tend to sign a subsidized 
pension more likely. In contrast to the literature, where Schulte and Zirpel (2010) find evidence of 
adverse selection in the decision making process for private pension insurance, our results suggest 
that adverse selection is only relevant for the uptake of “Riester”. 
As the subsidies rise with the number of children, we find a strong and positive gradient for the 
“Riester-pension”. Thus, the public incentives to take up a subsidized pension are working well. On 
contrary, the number of children is insignificant or even negative for the probability of a private 
pension. These reverse effects can be explained by recalling how the subsidies work. The 
combination of subsidy and personal contribution must account for at least 4 % of the individual’s 
yearly gross income to be eligible for the subsidies in the first place; the higher the subsidies the 
lower the personal contribution. This means that each additional child helps to reduce the personal 
contribution down to the lower limit of 60 € per year. Once the minimum personal contribution of 
60 € is reached, any additional subsidy increases the personal saving rate. This results in a 
considerable “leverage effect”. The observed results for children regarding subsidized “Riester-
pension” are consistent with these incentives. On the other side, unsubsidized pension, which does 
not provide an additional child benefit, is less often chosen by households with more than one child. 
With a look at income variables, we find a significantly negative coefficient for those relatively poor 
in both equations. Instead, higher income and relative wealth positively influence the take up only for 
private pension schemes; for Riester contracts, no significant effects can be found. These findings 
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indicate that political aims to induce higher old-age provisions of low income earners are not 
achieved. Subsidization thus has no effect and the incentives for low income groups failed to work. 
The employment effects are as expected: those full employed have a significantly higher likelihood to 
own a private pension while those in part-time employment use public subsidies and tend to have 
“Riester-pensions”. 
Table 4: Estimation results bivariate probit model - restricted 
 Riester pension  Private Pension Insurance 
 Coefficient |z|-value  Coefficient |z|-value 
Time fixed effects        
D2006 0.2847 4.05 ***  0.2871 4.95 *** 
D2007 0.5683 7.67 ***  0.0207 0.31 
 
D2008 0.7475 8.77 ***  -0.0198 0.28  
D2009 0.7793 8.66 ***  -0.0486 0.68  
Socioeconomic variables        
East German 0.1518 3.47 ***  0.1440 3.00 *** 
Female -0.0965 2.17 **  0.1285 2.86 *** 
Age quintile 2 0.2089 2.37 **  0.1618 2.38 ** 
Age quintile 3 0.1770 2.17 **  0.0936 1.28 
 
Age quintile 4 -0.1084 1.13   -0.1123 1.16 
 
Age quintile 5 -0.4494 4.52 ***  -0.0705 0.72 
 
Rest life 0.0073 3.32 ***  0.0017 0.74 
 
Number children 1 0.2393 4.45 ***  -0.0652 1.19 
 
Number children 2 0.4297 6.48 ***  -0.1897 2.71 *** 
Number children 3 0.4502 3.17 ***  -0.1512 1.15 
 
Married 0.2297 3.70 ***  0.0446 0.72 
 
Widowed -0.2338 1.07   0.0229 0.11 
 
Divorced 0.0664 0.97   0.0097 0.12 
 
O-Level 0.0485 1.03   -0.0033 0.04 
 
High school 0.1182 2.04 **  0.1744 2.30 ** 
University -0.0190 0.30   0.1059 1.84 * 
relative poor -0.3926 4.77 ***  -0.4541 5.22 *** 
precarious wealth -0.0400 0.74   -0.0792 1.45 
 
higher income 0.0647 1.03   0.1508 2.34 ** 
relative wealth  -0.0586 0.64   0.3045 4.00 *** 
Full time 0.0173 0.32   0.3358 6.08 *** 
Part time 0.1452 2.47 **  0.0942 1.37 
 
ρ 0.173  Wald test ρ=0 (
2 ) 48.95 *** 
McFadden R2 0.076  AIC   13,611.62  
McFadden R2 adj. 0.069  BIC   13,988.85  
N 6.824       
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01       
Regarding our full model (see Table 5), including financial variables changes the effects of children 
and education. While in the restricted model, some of the educational variables show a significantly 
positive impact this effect cannot be found in the full specification. This result emphasizes the role of 
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financial literacy. In the restricted model, these effects are possibly covered by the educational 
variables whereas in the full specification, financial assets and financial behavior have more 
relevance for the addressed question. The number of children has now a more negative impact on 
traditional private pensions. The magnitude of income effects decreased and for private pension 
insurance, higher income is no insignificant. The reason behind this can be seen in the inclusion of 
various financial variables. While in the restricted model, income is the only indicator regarding 
earnings and wealth whereas now assets are explicitly included. 
Alternative investments positively affect the uptake of both forms of provisions. It is interesting that 
other government-promoted investments (such as building loan contracts) are only relevant for the 
“Riester” decision indicating an affinity to state allowances. With exemption of home ownership, the 
positive effects of other assets can be viewed as “crowding in” among alternative investments. 
Hence, individuals use various forms of assets to make provisions for old-age. Those individuals who 
make use of financial advice are more likely to sign either form of pension. More interestingly, the 
interaction between advice and strong financial compliance is only relevant for “Riester”. It seems 
that financial intermediates have an incentive to promote the highly regulated “Riester pension”. The 
complexity of these products limits competition between various providers. High insurance 
commissions and marketing costs strengthen the incentives resulting in active marketing of “Riester-
pensions”. This indicates that financial consultants play an important role in the decision making 
process that may result in a significant demand inducement. 
The advantageous tax rules for private pension schemes are present by the significant positive 
coefficient of tax advisor. On contrary, tax expenditures for “Riester pensions” are limited and only 
favorable for high income groups. Saving motives play an important role for the old-age provision. 
Respondents stating to save for old age significantly own both forms of pensions. However, a closer 
look shows that the effect for private pension insurance is twice the effect for “Riester”. While the 
reason for this is unclear at first, taking into account subsidies as a saving motive sheds light on the 
investment decision. As expected, we find no effect of this motive for private pensions. Instead, the 
highly significant effect for “Riester pensions” indicates the importance of public subsidies. 
Comparing the magnitude of the saving motives’ coefficients lets us conclude that the subsidies 
motive dominates the old-age motive. Thus, people do not take a “Riester pension” because of 
securing pension payments only but to pick up granted subsidies. 
Finally, concerning our estimation approach, the correlation between the error terms of the two 
equations is highly significant positive. This means that the decisions on “Riester” and private 
pension insurance are not independent and therefore, separate estimations lead to a loss in 
efficiency. However, the correlation decreases by including financial variables but remains significant.  
21 
 
Table 5: Estimation results bivariate probit model – full specification 
 Riester pension  Private Pension Insurance 
 Coefficient |z|-value  Coefficient |z|-value 
Time fixed effects        
D2006 0.2711 3.74 ***  0.2786 4.32 *** 
D2007 0.5187 7.21 ***  -0.0658 1.06  
D2008 0.7167 8.78 ***  -0.1006 1.49  
D2009 0.7499 7.79 ***  -0.1166 1.68  
Socioeconomic variables        
East German 0.2132 4.06 ***  0.1775 3.63 *** 
Female -0.0912 1.79 *  0.1287 2.59 *** 
Age quintile 2 0.2235 3.07 ***  0.1333 1.78 * 
Age quintile 3 0.1542 1.99 **  0.0448 0.56  
Age quintile 4 -0.1096 1.32   -0.1713 1.62 5 
Age quintile 5 -0.5334 5.34 ***  -0.1379 1.13  
Rest life 0.0049 2.12 **  -0.0006 0.24  
Number children 1 0.1698 2.90 ***  -0.1092 1.92 ** 
Number children 2 0.3665 5.23 ***  -0.2182 2.57 *** 
Number children 3 0.4968 4.11 ***  -0.1773 1.22  
Married 0.1733 2.94 ***  -0.0105 0.17  
Widowed -0.1489 0.67   0.1357 0.60  
Divorced 0.1541 2.17 **  0.0638 0.86  
O-Level 0.0081 0.16   -0.0366 0.55  
High school 0.0822 1.35   0.0971 1.28  
University -0.0470 0.78   0.0795 1.28  
relative poor -0.1528 2.00 **  -0.3014 3.47 *** 
precarious wealth 0.0563 1.06   -0.0199 0.42  
higher income 0.0126 0.19   0.0890 1.39  
relative wealth  -0.1226 1.09   0.1665 2.00 ** 
Full time -0.0345 0.56   0.3173 5.29 *** 
Part time 0.1075 1.80 *  0.0895 1.34  
Financial variables        
building loan contract 0.2531 5.80 ***  0.0448 0.95  
Cash-value life insurance 0.1448 2.50 **  0.1773 4.22 *** 
Accumulation plan 0.1650 3.37 ***  0.1287 2.85 *** 
Stocks 0.1470 2.42 **  0.2617 5.26 *** 
Investment bonds 0.1889 2.79 ***  0.2927 4.37 *** 
Home owner 0.0231 0.58   -0.0300 0.52  
Financial advice 1 0.1907 3.53 ***  0.2016 2.53 ** 
Financial advice 2 0.2394 2.72 ***  0.1760 1.78 * 
Financial advice 1 *   
strong compliance 
0.3748 3.50 *** 
 
-0.0205 0.17  
Financial advice 2 *   
strong compliance 
0.2667 1.97 ** 
 
-0.0167 0.09  
Tax advisor -0.0187 0.30   0.1239 2.96 *** 
Risk aversion 0.0052 0.09   -0.0075 0.16  
Saving motive: old age 0.1796 4.28 ***  0.3422 7.41 *** 
Saving motive: subsidies 0.3091 4.60 ***  0.0314 0.64  
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ρ 0.098  Wald test ρ=0 ( ) 14.46 *** 
McFadden R2 0.122  AIC   13,008.59  
McFadden R2 adj. 0.111  BIC   13,581.43  
N 6.824       
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01       
6 Summary 
Regarding our research questions, our results confirm that governmental subsidies have positive 
incentive effects for private pension schemes. This is evident for the child allowances for the Riester 
pension. This means that each additional child helps to reduce the personal contribution down to the 
minimum limit. On contrary, the effect of children is negative for private pension insurance. Income 
effects are broadly discussed in the literature - with mixed results. For both forms of provision, we 
find a negative effect for those relatively poor. According to this the political aims to induce higher 
old-age provisions of low income earners are not achieved. Subsidization thus has no effect and the 
incentives for low income groups failed to work. Moreover, it is interesting to notice that not all 
explanatory factors influence the dependent variables in the same way. For instance, we find 
differences for age, number of children and the strength of financial compliance.  
Alternative investments seem to have an important impact on old-age provision. Thus, individuals 
use various forms of assets to ensure their current standard of living in future. These effects can be 
interpreted as “crowding in” among alternative investments. The question whether the uptake of 
private pensions is influenced by insurance agents can be confirmed. Indeed, demand inducement 
can be found for the subsidized “Riester pension” but not for traditional private pensions. Financial 
intermediates then have an incentive to promote the highly regulated “Riester pension”. Taking into 
account that we find no effects of education, the influence of financial intermediates challenges 
possible effects of improving financial literacy. In addition, saving motives play an important role for 
the old-age provision. In the decision making process to take up a “Riester pension”, granting 
subsidies dominate the old-age motive. 
Generally, regarding the future gap in the public pension system, any increase in private old-age 
arrangements seems to be positive. But it remains unclear whether the higher demand for “Riester 
pensions” in fact increases the private savings rate or whether we observe a substitution of 
unsubsidized through subsidized products. Finally, our empirical findings emphasize the relationship 
between different forms of private provision for old-age. Further research should analyze if 
individuals take the full choice set of different investments into account or if governmental subsidies 
distort competition between these alternatives. 
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